Russia-Ukraine War Flash Report - 03 FEB 2024 - 16:20 PST - Several Key Updates

Volgograd

Someone smarter than me believes that the drone attack on the Lukoil Refinery in Volgograd destroyed one of the decoking towers. They also initially believed that the condensate tower had been destroyed. I held back on declaring the condensate system destroyed after getting a hydrocracker versus a vacuum distillation system wrong at Krasnodar Krai. It wasn't errors and omissions territory - ultimately, they both do the same thing, just the process is different.

The difference? Had the distillation unit collapsed, the unit would have been completely offline for months. The decoking tower isn't as serious as losing the distillation unit, but they believe production in that part of the refinery will be cut by 50%. This aligns pretty well with the report from Lukoil.

Avdiivka

If you follow other sources, you may have seen multiple reports on Friday of a significant advance by Russian troops into the northern part of Avdiivka. You also may have noticed we didn't update the map (even on the days off, the map gets updated). There was a reason.

We have repeatedly seen in the Avdiivka AO reports of major Russian advances that a few days are rolled back. Why is this happening? After repeated reports of Russian advances past the industrial district on the southeastern edge of Avdiivka, we adopted a policy of not moving the line of conflict and creating a larger gray area. That was the right decision.

When we share geolocated videos, they are rarely from the same day of the attack, and often, they are more than 24 hours old. Ukraine has always had tight operational security, and Russia has significantly improved. By the time the videos are in the public domain, or we can share embargoed content, many of the Russian advances in the Avdiivka AO have already been rolled back. Or, Russian forces briefly breached Ukrainian defense but couldn't consolidate their gains. What was shared was the apex of the Russian assault.

Russian armor had already beached the dachas south of the sewer treatment plant and the Coke Plant terrikon in late November. Russian troops never consolidated their gains, and Ukraine stabilized its defensive lines. In the case of the most recent reports, the video showing Russian troops at the southern edge of the dachas is at least a week old, and once again, they were unable to consolidate their gains.

Our current map, gray area and all, remains accurate.

Klishchiivka

The third bit of important news is not on the map yet. Ukrainian forces were able to recapture their positions east of Klishchiivka and advance past the small reservoirs. This is a tactically significant gain.

How can Ukraine still be advancing

Why is this happening? Ukraine's artillery ammunition is critically low, and it has a personnel shortage.

First. Ukraine is using active defense. It's a combination of protecting their existing defensive lines while attacking Russian positions when opportunities present themselves. Troop rotations, overextended GLOCs, Russian units in small salients. This tactic capitalizes on any mistake Russia makes on the battlefield. Russia used this tactic in 2023. 

Second. Drones. Another wave of Russian milbloggers complained about a sharp increase in Ukrainian drone attacks, a significant improvement in tactics, new tactics, and the ineffectiveness of Russian electronic warfare systems. We can't say with authority that Ukraine produced 83K one-way drones last month, but the production has definitely increased as promised.

Drones are not the answer to everything, and drones combined with artillery would be ideal. Barrel and tubed artillery are immediate, and Ukrainian fire control is efficient - drones have to be flown in, and that takes time. Despite these limitations, Ukraine is using FPV one-way drones as an artillery substitute with devastating results. Russian troops can't move day or night without Ukrainians seeing every move. Russia has a similar advantage, but Ukraine is on defense - Russian troops are the ones moving in the open.

When Russian troops are being resupplied or rotated, drones are coming in and attacking the rotation. Using active defense, Ukrainian forces move forward, capture the Russian positions, and consolidate. Russian fire control is a cumbersome, broken process. By the time a fire mission is approved, Ukrainian forces are already dug in. If Russian armor tries to advance, it is picked off by one-way drones.

Sidebar - analysis is incredibly difficult

Are Ukrainian positions being overrun? Yes. Are Ukrainian troops dying? Yes. Is it easy for Ukrainian forces? No, it's pure Hell. But I will admit we were overly doomy in October and November.

We are talking about the need to recalibrate our thinking from late 20th-century warfare to this new, evolving model. The closest historical example to work with is the last two years of World War I and the interwar period. It's one of the reasons analysis has been on the lighter side and yes - I am seeing all the comments on "why did the analysis go away." It's very hard right now because combined arms maneuver warfare with heavy air support no longer works.

The September 2022 Kharkiv Counteroffensive is likely the last time the world will see late 20th-century maneuver warfare in an area this large, over a short time period, involving more than 100,000 troops when you count both combatants. We also had eyes on the ground in the area, as long-time subscribers know. We also have great muscle in warfare history, strategy, and tactics. We could see the metaphorical chess pieces moving. The offensive didn't surprise us (or are readers/listeners). What surprised us was the speed. That history is out the window. The Kharkiv Counteroffensive would be impossible today. Drones see everything.

Back to why is Ukraine still advancing

Back to artillery. While Russia has a 3:1 to 6:1 artillery advantage right now, they are dealing with their own shortages, firing between 7K to 10K rounds a day, compared to 60K to 80K rounds a day in the first half of 2022. Russia is also wasting between 400 to 800 rounds a day on civilian targets in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kherson oblasts. Waste isn't a loss of objectivity. On the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, Russian troops continue to complain aloud about a lack of artillery support and call out the pointless Russian fire missions and air strikes on free Ukraine. 

Third. A change in Ukrainian tactics. A year ago in Bakhmut, the ratio of losses for Ukraine vs Russia was close to 1:1. Now, it is around 1:10 in Ukraine's favor. On defense, 1:3 to 1:5 would be expected. A few days in November in the Avdiivka AO, it did dip to 1:3. On some days, I can tell you that the ratio is even better than 1:10.

If Ukrainian troops are threatened with being overrun, improvement in echelon defense is permitting tactical/fighting withdrawals to the next defensive line. Last year's tactic of hold at any cost has been replaced with fallback if it's tactically advantageous. In some locations, Ukrainian forces intentionally withdrew from areas that they likely should have never advanced into in the first place, such as north of Khromove. That became a costly mistake, with Ukrainian forces falling back even further than the peak Russian advance of May 2022. However, it's Russian forces that are now stuck in a swampy exposed lowland.

Another good example of this was at Tabaivka in Kharkiv. Russia advertised their advance like they had captured Kyiv. The village that was once home to 34 holds no tactical advantage. The bad news was the Russian advance past the P-07 Highway, not the momentary occupation of Tabaivka. The advance into the village put Russian troops in a salient. It's no surprise that they couldn't consolidate.

Krynky

Last one - more videos south of Krynky showing Ukrainian troops have advanced into the forests south of the village and consolidated their gains. The Russian bunker network looks relatively well constructed, so it's going to be tough to pry them out. Ukrainian forces also expanded their control of the village (it is 10 km long) and improved their bridgeheads. This is probably why Russian milbloggers have gone silent.

I don't know how much longer we'll be seeing content from Russian milblogger Romanov Light. He flew to Moscow and is making videos and posts demanding to meet with the General Staff to provide his report on the "real" situation on the left banks of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers. This probably won't end well as he is now committing multiple violations of Russia's so-called "don't say war laws," and he already had quality time with the FSB over the summer.